Army Flanders Spanish Road 2ed: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars (Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History) Paperback – Illustrated, 21 Aug. 2008

As the back cover of this important book clearly states: Its publication in 1972 "marked the birth of the 'new military history', which emphasized military organization - mobilization, pay, supply, morale and, above all, logistics - rather than military 'events' such as sieges and battles".The book is not (and does not pretend to be) a narrative of the Dutch Revolt or a chronological history of The Army of Flanders. Battles and sieges are only mentioned in passing, and only with the purpose of illustrating other points. The book is about military organization, not about campaigns or feats of arms. The layman will probably find it heavy going, but for the serious student of military history it makes fascinating reading.The Army of Flanders was the largest standing army of its time. With a peace-time footing of just over 10,000 men, during much of its history its strength was of around 60,000 troops and reached 86,000 at peak periods. It was a multinational force of six "Nations": Spanish, Italians, Germans, Burgundians, Walloons (i.e. natives) and English-Irish.Most of these troops were not "foreigners" but subjects of the Spanish monarchy, which at the time controlled not only the Iberian Peninsula but also areas of Italy (Sicily, Naples, Milan ...), the Franche-Comté and, of course, the Netherlands. The Germans were often Catholics with allegiance to the other Habsburg branch: the (Austrian) Emperors. The English tended to be Catholic exiles; and the Irish claimed that they were vassals of the Kings of Spain by ancient treaties and traditions. Other European states such as France also relied heavily on foreign troops, but in Spain's case the foreigners were often subjects of other kingdoms of the Spanish empire.Parker maintains that, in the end, money was the most significant factor in victory or defeat in the Netherlands, and provides an impressive amount of evidence to back up this thesis. Spain could only have prevailed in the Netherlands if she had been able to concentrate all her resources there. As a global and over-extended empire, this was never possible. Madrid had to fight the Turks in the Mediterranean, protect her American colonies and her Italian possessions, assist the Habsburgs in the Empire ...Spain was thus confronted not only with rebellion by the determined Dutch, but with wars with the English, the French, the German Protestants and the Turks. She came close to victory several times, but time and time again she diverted her resources elsewhere at critical times: the Armada, the French Wars of Religion, the Mantua Succession, the Thirty Years War, the campaigns against the Turks ...Parker's study of the Army of Flanders makes fascinating reading. Yes, conditions for the soldiers were harsh and their pay, when it came, was always in arrears, but life was hard in the period under study and civilians probably fared much worse. There were many mutinies, which can be more properly described as "military strikes": the men refused to obey until grievances were redressed, the most frequent grievance being lack of pay. And once pay came, they returned to obedience. The soldiers made a point of honour to mutiny after battle, not before or during action. Parker calls the mutinies the earliest (or one of the earliest) examples of industrial action. He demonstrates that the men mutinied to get paid, not out of fear of being sent into action.According to Parker, soldiers were more effective and reliable when fighting away from their home country, because they could not desert so easily. Thus, the most respected units of the Army of Flanders were the Spanish and the Italians, with the native Walloons being regarded as poor. However, when Walloon troops were sent to other theatres of operations, their performance was excellent. This finding is surprising, since troops always fight harder to protect their own homes ... yet Parker's argument about the near-impossibility of desertion and a return home as a key motivator makes perfect sense.What Parker does not emphasize enough, however, was that Spain's final war objective was unrealistic. Madrid not only wanted to bring back the rebellious Dutch to obedience. She wanted them to abandon their Protestant faith and return to the Catholic fold. A negotiated peace was therefore impossible. Madrid's aim meant total victory, and to achieve it she would have had to conquer every inch of enemy territory and proceed to a religious version of "ethnic cleansing". In the end, she was never strong enough to overrun the entire Netherlands and extirpate Protestantism, but this was not a foregone conclusion. During the period under study, the Catholic Habsburgs succeeded in doing this in Bohemia and Hungary; Louis XIV achieved religious uniformity in France with his expulsion of the Huguenots; and Spain disposed of her Muslim and Jewish minorities.I strongly recommend this book, but readers must be aware that they are not acquiring a military narrative. Parker has written a book called "The Dutch Revolt" which gives an excellent (and brief account) of that struggle. This should not be one's first book on the war between Spain and the Netherlands.I would recommend to start by Parker's "The Dutch Revolt" and then proceed to read "The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road", which should be used as a complement.Fascinating book, but not for the layman or the faint-hearted!

This book was first published in 1972, with a second revised edition in 2004, and it remains the masterpiece that it was some forty years ago. It is a remarkable piece of scholarship and exhibits considerable research through the records across Europe (not only the Spanish archives).Having mentioned this, it may not be for "beginners". To put it slightly differently, this book is about the Army of Flanders and its logistics over a period of almost a century (1567-1659) during which the Spanish Empire fought an interminable war against its "rebel" provinces which would become the Netherlands. It is not about the war itself, the causes of the conflict or its main events even if the main phases and many of the main events are mentioned.Despite this, the book is outstanding in several respects. First, it is rather remarkable in showing how the first "modern superpower" was able to sustain an eighty year war (with a twelve year truce somewhere in the middle) on a huge scale although the conflict took place over seven hundred miles from Spain. Second, it explains why the Spanish Superpower kept up its relentless struggle for so long and at such a huge cost. Third, it also shows how its huge multinational army (composed of Spaniards, Italians, Germans, but also several thousands of English and Irish Catholics and, of course, thousands of troops raised in Flanders itself from the "loyalists subjects" of the Spanish Empire) was brought to Flanders, equipped, fed and paid. The efforts deployed to this effect were herculean, but also often insufficient, with the soldiers' pay being chronically in arrears and the troops frequently underfed.Fourth, and perhaps more than anything else, the book seeks to explain why such a huge effort from the State and so many sacrifices and sufferings from its soldiers. There were numerous reasons which Geoffrey Parker presents and discusses one after the other. Some were political and had to do with the Spanish imperial mind set - only total victory was acceptable. A number of mistakes were made. The Dutch Revolt was supported by Spain's enemies. The Dutch devised a complex set of defences that transformed the war into an endless series of difficult and long sieges and sustained their own war effort by developing a commercial overseas Empire of their own. The effort implied by keeping such a huge army permanently in the field for decades proved to be too much even for Spain and despite the riches coming from the Americas.Fifth, the book also includes sections on the day-to-day life, or, perhaps more accurately in many cases, the daily ordeal and suffering of the soldiers of the Army of Flanders. Another section analyses how the army reacted and adapted to the often appalling terms of service and treatments that it had to cope with, including mutiny and desertion.Another remarkable feature of this book is the author's tone and style. There is no bias either way, or at least none that I was aware of. Also, the author's analysis is meticulous and his style is clear, with each point being carefully argued and demonstrated.Finally, this volume is probably also a good "companion book" for anyone wanting to known more about the War in Flanders and for those that have either read the books of Arturo Perez-Reverte (the Captain Alatriste series) or seen the film that have been derived from these books (with a rather superb Viggo Mortensen in the role of Alatriste).A complete narrative of the War in Flanders is certainly missing but then this was not the book's subject so it can hardly be tasked for this. Besides, the author has come up with such a narrative in another one of his other books (the Dutch Revolt). Accordingly, I cannot see how I could have rated this book anything less than five stars.

This is the result of an impressive research through the archives of Western Europe. What is studied here from an impartial point of view is how Spain could keep a war against the Dutch "rebels" going on for 80 years. So it analyzes in one hand the political part of the story, that is the medieval-style policy carried out from Philip II to Philip IV of Spain which gave rise to Spain's Black Legend but in the other hand it is mainly focused in the prodigious logistics, organization and financial aspects of how to take the troops to Flanders from Spain and Italy, pay them (sometimes) and feed and lodge them (most of the time). One wonders what would have happened if that huge effort, which in the end gave way to revolts all over the Spanish monarchy due to excess of taxation, had been put for better aims. If you are not familiar with this part of European history is much better to start with the last chapter, giving a brief of the several phases of the war.

Geoffrey Parker describes in this book the importance of the control of the roads through Swiss on the balance of powers in the age of Philip II. Victory and defeat in the Low Countries and in Germany, are correlated to the capacity of Spain to link these areas with its possessions in Italy.

an academic but not a clever work. History is for creative and interesting people, something that i do not consider a characteristic of mr Parker.

I was doing an essay on the Army of Flanders for my history class at university. My professor suggested I start with this book. There is no doubt why; Geoffrey Parker is great! The detail he uses to explain why the Army of Flanders was the best military force in Europe throughout the 17th century. He breaks it down, allowing you to go through the book and find exactly what you really want to know. Also at the back he has a range of charts, showing in detail the Army of Flanders by year. For example he shows in a chart the strength of the Army of Flanders through out the 17th century. This enables you to look at specific dates and find out how big the army was at that time. However, I must admit that the book is more an enhancement or complimentary book rather than a full account of the history. In effect it is good to use to gain a more in depth idea about the Army of Flanders, adding to other general books on 17th century Spain and the Netherlands, but will not provide the greatest of contexts. If this is what you are looking for, go no further, Geoffrey Parker is an amazing historian, especially on the military of Golden Age Spain. The book makes you think more in depth about warfare in Early Modern Europe.

Geoffrey Parker's book is a true delight to read, and highly recommended to those interested not only the 80 Years' War, but in how the greater picture of Europe of that early modern period formed and shifted dramatically.The Spanish Habsburgs were in the Low Countries, and the Dutch wanted to first assert their rights, and eventually wanted to become independent. Spain wanted to keep their holdings, because of their belief in the Domino Theory: if the Dutch were allowed to leave Pax Hispania, the entire Spanish Empire would crumble. But how can the Spanish send troops, supplies, and money from Spain to the Low Countries? This is what the book tries to answer.The Austrian Habsburg cousins were at least willing to let Spanish troops through. But what about the Swiss, the Savoyards, the French, and the many members states of the Holy Roman Empire? How did the war last so long, and how did soldiers fare?Unlike many other conflicts, the 80 Years' War is perhaps the hardest to explain in the popular fashion of heroic actors. The factors are too complex, and the war dragged on so long no small set of heroes could capture the war. This is good and bad: it is bad because it is seldom covered in English-language books. But it is good because it gives good motivation to authors in the style of Geoffrey Parker.This book starts off with a bit of difficulty. But it gain traction and its final chapter which revisits the related 30 Years' War is perhaps the best briefing of how that conflict arose.In closing, I highly recommend this book to anybody who has started to wonder how conflict really evolve beyond the simplistic "heroic actors" style of writing.

Los libros me han gustado mucho. Son obras muy importentes, de las que ya tenía suficientes referencias. No ha habido sorpresas. El servicio de Amazon, muy correcto. Gracias.

This is NOT military history describing battles etc. It is, never the less, a fascinating study in keeping an army in the field and all the associated problems involved. Bearing in mind the Spanish army at this period was considered the best in the world, and were stretched to eventual breaking point, it makes you wonder how other monarchs and their armies coped.If you are looking for a 'zippy' military history book, this is probably not for you. If logistics do it for you, great read !

I was recommended this book by Bret Deveraux of acoup.blog. I highly recommend the blog. I also have read the entirety of Fernand Braudel's The Mediterranean in the time of Phillip II.I don't think I learned all that much from this book that I didn't get from the blog or from Braudel. Braudel, of course, is the founder of the Annales school of history. Volume I is concerned with the broader forces, and Volume II is concerned with the history of the reign. It doesn't even focus on Northern Europe all that much. Acoup is a blog, but from that, I learned about Traces Italiennes, and what quartering troops entails.Also, the book assumes you are conversant with the characters involved. Without reading Braudel first, and also, recently, Don Quixote, I would be totally lost. I'm still mostly lost.If you are an academic historian focusing on this period, ok, fine. But for even advanced amateurs, I would stay away. That said, the writing is clear and to the point. You just need a lot of background, and I am not sure Wikipedia is quite enough.